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AGGREGATION OF VALUE JUDGMENTS DIFFERS FROM 
AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES 
Wlodek Rabinowicz 
Lund University and London School of Economics 
 
Abstract: This paper focuses on the contrast between aggregation of individual preference rankings to a 
collective preference ranking and aggregation of individual value judgments to a collective value judgment. The 
targeted case is one in which the two aggregation scenarios exhibit a far-reaching structural similarity: more 
precisely, the case in which the individual judgments that are to be aggregated are value rankings. This means 
that, formally, the individual judgments are isomorphic to individual preference rankings over a given set of 
alternatives. The paper suggests that, despite of their formal similarity as rankings, the difference in the nature of 
individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications: the kind of procedure that looks fine 
for aggregation of judgments turns out to be inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The relevant procedure 
consists in similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of average distance from individual 
inputs. It is shown that, whatever measure is chosen, distance-based procedures violate the (strong) Pareto 
condition. This seems alright as value judgment aggregation goes, but would be unacceptable for preference 
aggregation. 
   When applied to judgment aggregation, distance-based procedures might also be approached from the 
epistemic perspective: questions might be posed concerning their advantages as truth-trackers. From that 
perspective, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome being true, but also its expected 
verisimilitude: its expected distance from truth. 
 Key words: preference aggregation, judgment aggregation, preference, value judgment, distance-based methods, 
Pareto, Condorcet’s jury theorem, distance measures, verisimilitude, truth-tracking, Kemeny. 
 
The point of departure in my story is the contrast between two models of democratic voting: 
popular democracy, as exemplified by popular elections and referenda, and what might be 
called committee democracy, i.e., voting in smaller bodies of experts or specially appointed 
laymen. What is the difference between these two models, viewed as ideal types? On one 
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interpretation, voting in popular democracy aggregates the individuals’ preferences to 
something like a collective preference. In committee democracy, on the other hand, what is 
being aggregated are the committee members’ judgments and the outcome is the collective 
judgment of the committee as a whole. In some cases, the question before a committee might 
be of an empirical nature: Will the bridge that is being planned hold? Or, what will be the 
noise level in the vicinity of railway if the number of tracks is doubled? But, very often, the 
relevant question facing the committee is normative or evaluative: What is to be done? What 
is the best alternative? Or, how are the alternatives to be ranked from the best to the worst?
1
 
Preferring one alternative to another is not the same as judging it to be better. Judgments 
of betterness, and in general value judgments, often accompany preferences and the latter 
might often be based on the former. But it is possible to prefer a to b even though one lacks a 
clear view about their relative value. Indeed, it is even possible to judge b to be better than a 
and still prefer a to b; perhaps because one thinks that a is better for oneself, even though one 
considers b to be better overall; or perhaps because one is simply irrational. Consequently, 
aggregation of preferences is not reducible to aggregation of value judgments. 
Needless to say, contrasting aggregation of preferences with aggregation of judgments 
is a highly idealized and simplified way of describing the difference between popular 
democracy and committee democracy. Real life democratic processes are more complicated 
than this. For example, in a committee vote, some of the members might give expression to 
their personal preferences rather than to their impartial judgments on the matter at hand. And 
in a popular election or a referendum some voters might well think of the process in terms of 
judgment aggregation: instead of expressing a preference, their vote might express a value 
judgment regarding the options between which the choice is to be made. The multi-tiered 
structure of representative democracy additionally complicates the nature of the aggregation 
procedure. The focus on aggregation means that one ignores such essential elements of the 
democratic process as deliberation and negotiations, setting-up the agenda of issues on which 
the vote is to be made, etc.  
                                                 
1
 On another interpretation, even in popular democracy voters are expressing their judgments rather than 
preferences. But, on that interpretation, while in a committee all the members answer the same question (ideally, 
at least), the question posed in a popular election or a referendum varies from voter to voter. Ideally at least, each 
voter answers something like the question: Is this proposal good for me? And the outcome of aggregation is then 
a judgment concerning whether the proposal is good for the collective of voters taken as a whole.  
If one, instead, thought of voters in popular democracy as expressing their views on the same question, 
say, on whether a given proposal is good for the collective as a whole, then – on this idealized picture – popular 
democracy would be like committee democracy: In both cases the function of the democratic procedure would 
be to aggregate the voters’ judgments on the issue at hand.  
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While bearing this in mind, still my focus here will be on the simple contrast between 
aggregation of preference rankings and aggregation of judgments. What I want to consider is 
the case in which the two aggregation scenarios exhibit a far-reaching structural similarity: 
more precisely, the case in which the individual judgments that are to be aggregated are value 
rankings. This means that, formally, the individual judgments are isomorphic to individual 
preference rankings over a given set of alternatives. But while in a preference ranking the 
alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking 
expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best at the top to the 
worst at the bottom. I will suggest that, despite of their formal similarity as rankings, this 
difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important 
implications: the kind of procedure that looks fine for aggregation of judgments turns out to 
be inappropriate for aggregation of preferences. The procedure I have in mind consists in 
similarity maximization, or – more precisely – in minimization of average distance from 
individual inputs. When applied to judgment aggregation, this procedure can also be 
approached from the epistemic perspective: the questions will be posed concerning its 
advantages as a truth-tracker. From that perspective, what matters is not only the probability 
of the outcome of the procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the 
outcome: its expected distance from truth. 
 
Impossibility theorems 
In recent years, much work has been done on judgment aggregation. For a survey, see List 
and Puppe (2009) and List (2012). A typical set-up for judgment aggregation involves a finite 
set of individuals and an agenda - a finite set of propositions that may or may not be logically 
interconnected. Individuals are supposed to come up with their judgments, i.e. to specify 
which propositions on the agenda they accept and which they reject. It is assumed that each 
such individual input is logically consistent and complete (in the sense that each proposition 
on the agenda is either accepted or denied). The goal is to aggregate these individual inputs 
into a collective output – a set of collective judgments. More precisely, the goal is to specify 
which propositions of the agenda are accepted by the collective and which are rejected.  
Many of the contributions to this discussion concern the existence problem: Is there any 
general procedure for judgment aggregation that satisfies reasonable requirements? Here are 
some examples of such requirements: 
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Universal Domain: The procedure should deliver a definite collective outcome for every 
possible profile of individual inputs; 
Consistency: The collective outcome should be logically consistent; 
Completeness: Each proposition on the agenda should be either accepted or denied in the 
collective outcome.
2
 
Non-Dictatorship: There should be no individual whose vote is decisive for the collective 
outcome, independently of how the other individuals vote; 
Anonymity: The collective outcome should be invariant under permutations on individuals, 
i.e., all individuals should be given equal influence (this is of course a stronger requirement 
than non-dictatorship); 
Unanimity: If all individuals agree on a certain judgment, then that judgment should be part of 
the collective outcome; 
Neutrality: If in a given profile of individual judgments two propositions are treated equally 
by each individual (one proposition is accepted if and only if the other is accepted), the 
collective outcome should also treat these propositions equally; 
Independence: The collective judgment regarding each proposition should only depend on the 
individual judgments regarding that proposition. 
It has been proved by several researchers that different lists of such plausible 
requirements give rise to impossibility theorems to the effect that there is no aggregation 
procedure that satisfies all the requirements on the list in question.
3
 Clearly, there is an 
obvious analogy here with Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem for preference aggregation. 
The requirements that have been shown to spell trouble for judgment aggregation exhibit 
striking similarities to the postulates that Arrow and his followers imposed on aggregation of 
preferences. There we also have such postulates as universal domain, non-dictatorship, 
anonymity, unanimity, neutrality and independence (with the latter condition stating that the 
                                                 
2
 If the number of voters who accept a proposition is the same as the number of voters who deny it, then 
requiring the collective to either deny or to accept the proposition in question seems implausible. This shows that 
Completeness is a problematic requirement, especially if the procedure is required to deliver a definite (single) 
collective outcome for each profile, but one needs something in the vicinity of Completeness if the conditions on 
the aggregation procedure are to have any real bite. 
3
 To be more precise, whether some axioms lead to an impossibility depends on the agenda,: the more the 
propositions on the agenda are interconnected, the more it is likely that we will run into impossibility. 
Furthermore, the logically stronger the axioms are, the larger is the class of agendas for which we get 
impossibility. I am indebted to the anonymous referee for pressing these points. 
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collective preference over any two alternatives only depends on the individual preferences 
over the two alternatives in question). And we also have an analogue of consistency and 
completeness: just as individual preferences, the collective preferences should form a ranking, 
i.e. they should be transitive and complete.  
Indeed, there are close analogies in the very points of departure for these two 
‘impossibility programs’: In the case of preference aggregation, this point of departure was 
Condorcet’s paradox for majority voting. In that paradox, which involves three alternatives, a, 
b, and c, and at least three voters, there is a majority, M1, that prefers a over b, and another 
majority, M2, that prefers b over c; but there is no majority that prefers a over c. In fact, there 
is a majority with the opposite preference - for c over a. The reason is that, as it happens, a is 
preferred to c only by voters who belong to both M1 and M2, but the overlap between 
majorities M1 and M2 is too small to form a majority itself. 
The point of departure for the impossibility program with respect to judgment 
aggregation was the so-called ‘doctrinal paradox’ in legal theory (cf. Kornhauser and Sager 
1986, 1993). Nowadays, following Philip Pettit, one often refers to this problem as ‘the 
discursive dilemma’ (cf. Pettit 2001). In the discursive dilemma, there is a majority M1 for a 
proposition p, another majority, M2, for a proposition q, but there is no majority for the 
conjunction pq. In fact, there is a majority against pq.  Just as in Condorcet’s paradox, the 
source of the dilemma is that the overlap between the majorities M1 and M2 is too small to 
form a majority itself.  
 
Finessing impossibility results 
What I want to examine is a way to finesse these impossibility theorems. Instead of discussing 
various requirements on the aggregation procedure one by one and trying to undermine some 
of them, we could re-think the very nature of the procedure and its point. An attractive idea is 
to look at aggregation as an optimization task: From this perspective, aggregation is a goal-
driven activity and the right procedure for aggregation should promote that goal as much as 
possible. So, what could be the proper goal for aggregation? A plausible suggestion is to look 
at aggregation as a process in which we endeavour to give individuals as much influence on 
the collective output as possible, in the following sense: the output should reflect the 
individual inputs to a maximal extent. To put it in a different way, this means that we aim to 
reach an outcome that is as similar as possible to the individual inputs. On one way of making 
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this task of similarity maximization more precise, the goal could be to reach an outcome 
whose distance to inputs is as short as possible, on the average. 
An alternative to simple averaging could be to adopt some form of a ‘prioritarian’ 
approach, which would mean that we overweight in aggregation longer distances between an 
outcome and individual inputs. I.e., that we give such longer distances disproportionately 
larger negative weight, so to speak. This could be done by subjecting the outcome’s distances 
to inputs to a convex transformation (such as, say, raising the distances to the power of k, for 
some k > 1) and then minimizing the average of the transformed distances. Another and more 
extreme approach on these lines is ‘leximin’, on which we first try to make the outcome’s 
maximal distance to inputs as short as possible and then minimize the number of inputs that 
lie at this maximal distance, secondly we do the same with the distance that is second in 
length (i.e., we minimize its length and then minimize the number of inputs lying at that 
distance), and so on. In what follows, I shall mostly focus on the minimization of average 
distance but I do this primarily for simplicity’s sake. 
The distance minimization approach to aggregation isn’t new, of course. In the case of 
preference aggregation, it can be traced back to Kemeny (1959), where it was presented as a 
way of disarming Arrow’s impossibility result. I shall say more about Kemeny’s proposal 
below. In the case of judgment aggregation, distance minimization was suggested by Pigozzi 
(2006) and it has been further studied by Miller & Osherson (2009) and Duddy & Piggins 
(2011).  
Obviously, distance minimization need not deliver a unique outcome: There may be 
several outcomes that all minimize average distance. Optimization procedure will then deliver 
a set of outcomes as its output, rather than a single outcome. To this extent, then, distance 
minimization violates the condition of universal domain: it does not deliver a definite 
collective stance for every profile of individual inputs. However, this violation is rather 
innocuous. The optimization procedure still delivers a definite set of admissible collective 
stances for every such profile (cf. Kemeny 1959). The condition of universal domain will thus 
be satisfied by minimization of average distance if we let the aggregation procedure be a 
multifunction, which to every profile of individual inputs assigns a non-empty set of 
alternative collective outputs – a set which need not be a singleton.4 
                                                 
4
 At least in the case of judgment aggregation, however, it might be argued that the collective should suspend 
judgment in the case of a tie, rather than be permitted to simply pick one of the tied outcomes as its stance. 
Personally, I am in favour of doxastic permissivism, but there are philosophers who find it abhorrent. For recent 
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The distance minimization procedure can however be expected to violate some other 
standard requirements on aggregation. In particular, it is to be expected that the independence 
condition is not going to hold for plausible distance measures. But I suppose that we can look 
upon such violations with equanimity. After all, the standard requirements on are not 
unassailable. Supposing we can show that they shouldn’t hold if the proper objective is to 
reach an outcome that is as similar as possible to the individual inputs, then this would justify 
our rejection of those requirements. But I shall say more on this issue below. 
Determination of similarities or distances is much facilitated if inputs and outcomes are 
objects of the same type. Thus, if inputs are consistent and complete sets of judgments with 
respect to a certain agenda, an outcome is of the same type if it is a consistent and complete 
set of judgments with respect to the same agenda. Analogously, if the inputs are rankings of a 
certain set of alternatives, an outcome is of the same type if it is a ranking of the same 
alternatives. If it is a matter of preferential rankings on the input side, the same should apply 
to the output side: an outcome should specify the collective preference. If, on the other hand, 
the inputs are individual value rankings, the same should apply to outcomes: an outcome 
should then be a collective value ranking. 
 
Distance minimization 
Since aggregation of rankings by way of distance minimization will be my main topic, I 
should say more about how one can measure distance between rankings. Needless to say, 
several different metrics might be used in this context; see Appendix for a presentation of a 
number of metrics of this kind. However, probably the most widely known is the measure 
proposed in Kemeny (1959) and Kemeny & Snell (1962). In what follows, I shall refer to it as 
the KS-measure or the KS-distance. To define it, note first that a ranking, x, can be 
represented as a set of ordered pairs of alternatives, with a pair (a, b) belonging to x if and 
                                                                                                                                                        
criticisms of permissivism (though not in the particular context of aggregation of individual judgments but 
instead with respect to the more general relation between evidence and judgment), see White (2005, 2013), 
Hedden (forthcoming) and Horowitz (forthcoming). For defences of permissivism (again, with respect to the 
relation between evidence and judgment), see Rosen (2001), Kelly (2013), Schoenfield (1014), Meacham 
(forthcoming) and Mayo-Wilson & Wheeler (forthcoming). 
   The anti-permissivist position might require either that the collective judgment should be the intersection of the 
outcomes that minimize average distance to inputs, or that the collective standpoint should be an indeterminate 
doxastic state that can be represented as the set of all those judgmental outcomes that minimize the average 
distance to the inputs. On the latter approach, none of the outcomes in in the doxastic state is admissible: The 
only admissible stance is the indeterminate state itself. Note that the set representation is more informative than 
the intersection approach, since different sets of outcomes can have the same intersection.  
This idea of the collective suspending judgment when faced with a tie will only be marginally touched upon 
in what follows, but it certainly deserves further study. 
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only if x ranks a at least as highly as b. Now, the KS-distance between two rankings, x and y, 
is simply the number of ordered pairs that belong to either x or y but not to both these 
rankings.  
The Kemeny rule enjoins us to choose a ranking that minimizes the sum of its KS-
distances to the individual inputs, or – what amounts to the same – that minimizes the average 
KS-distance to individual inputs.
5
 
Kemeny (1959) was fully aware that his rule violated some of Arrow’s requirements on 
the aggregation procedure: not only the requirement that the procedure should deliver a 
unique outcome (on this matter, see above), but also the requirement of “independence of 
irrelevant alternatives”. We might well have a case in which the collective outcome picked 
out by the Kemeny rule ranks alternatives a and b differently vis-à-vis each other depending 
on how some third alternative is ranked by the individuals. Thus, in violation of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives, the collective ranking of two alternatives does not 
exclusively depend on how these alternatives are mutually ranked by the individuals in 
question.
6
 But Kemeny did not consider it to be a weighty objection against his proposal. If 
distance minimization violates independence, then so be it: this shows that independence is 
not a reasonable requirement. 
If individual rankings that are the inputs in the aggregation process are interpreted as 
value judgments, or as sets of value judgments, then the Kemeny rule may be seen as a form 
                                                 
5
 See Kemeny (1959). For a study of the Kemeny rule and its properties, cf. Saari & Merlin (2000). Kemeny 
(1959) also considers a ‘prioritarian’ rule as an alternative: On that rule, one minimizes the sum of the squared 
distances to inputs, which means that longer distances are given a disproportionate weight as compared with 
shorter distances. 
6
 The example he used to show this involved two different ways in which three individuals, 1, 2 and 3, might 
rank three alternatives, a, b, and c: 
Profile A 
1 2 3   Outcome 
a a b     a 
c c a Kemeny rule   b, c 
b b c 
 
Profile B 
1 2 3   Outcome 
a a b   a, b 
b b c Kemeny rule     c  
c c a 
 
In the outcome for profile A, a is ranked above b if the Kemeny rule is used, while in the outcome for profile B, 
a and b are tied. But the two profiles exhibit exactly the same pattern as far the mutual rankinga of a and b are 
concerned: individuals 1 and 2 rank a above b, while individual 3 ranks b above a. 
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of judgment aggregation. But what are then the propositions on the agenda in? We might 
think of these propositions in holistic terms, as the competing value rankings of the 
alternatives, with the voter’s task being to accept one of the rankings and to reject all the 
others. But we might also think of them in a piecemeal fashion: For each ordered pair (a, b) of 
the alternatives that are being compared, we might assume that the agenda contains the 
proposition that a is at least as good as b. Then the voter’s task is to accept some of these 
propositions and to reject the others, in such a way that the pattern of acceptances and 
rejections gives rise to a well-formed ranking. The voter’s judgments are then of the form “a 
is/is not at least as good as b”. Given this second interpretation, we can connect Kemeny’s 
rule as applied to value rankings to Pigozzi’s (2006) general account of judgment aggregation 
in terms of distance minimization. She considered a case in which individual inputs were 
consistent and complete sets of judgments with respect to a given agenda (i.e. took a stand on 
every proposition on that agenda). Essentially, her idea was to let an outcome be a consistent 
and complete set of judgments that, as compared with other such consistent and complete sets 
of judgments, minimized the average distance to individual inputs. The metric she used was 
the so-called Hamming distance: For sets X and Y, the Hamming distance between X and Y is 
the cardinality of their symmetric difference, i.e., the number of items that belong either to X 
or to Y, but not to both. Now, if we apply this to value rankings and interpret value rankings 
as sets of judgments of the form “a is/is not at least as good as b”, then it is easy to see that 
the Hamming distance between rankings is just the KS-distance multiplied by two. (To every 
ordered pair (a, b) that belongs to one of the rankings x and y, but not to both, correspond two 
judgments in the symmetrical difference between the judgment sets associated with x and y: 
“a is at least as good as b” and “a is not at least as good as b”.) Consequently, minimization of 
the average Hamming distance between rankings is equivalent to the minimization of the 
average KS-distance.
7
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7
 Using the Hamming distance as the measure of distance between sets of judgements is problematic. The 
obvious objection is that this kind of metric abstracts from the content of the judgments that are being compared. 
Thus, the Hamming distance is the same between, say, a judgment that the value of a certain parameter is 1 and 
the judgment that this value is 0 as between the judgments that this value is 1 and .9, respectively. Another kind 
of criticism has been levelled by Duddy & Piggins (2012), who argue that the Hamming metric will sometimes 
involve double-counting if the propositions on the agenda are allowed to be logically interconnected. To use 
their example, if two individuals both accept a proposition p, then they disagree on the conjunction p  q iff they 
disagree on q. The Hamming metric, which counts both their disagreement on p  q and their disagreement on q, 
seems guilty of double-counting in such a case. In view of the relationship between the Hamming metric and the 
KS-measure, this objection might have implications for the use of the latter measure as well. And indeed, Duddy 
and Piggins (2012) argue that it does. For their own proposal of a measure of distance between rankings, see 
Appendix. 
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Pareto condition 
Are there any important differences in the formal requirements on the aggregation procedure 
depending on what is being aggregated? As we have seen, many standard requirements seem 
to be essentially the same for preference aggregation and for the aggregation of judgments: 
non-dictatorship, unanimity, universal domain, etc. But if we focus on the case in which the 
judgments to be aggregated exhibit the same formal structure as preferences, i.e. on the case 
when judgmental inputs are value rankings, we discover one striking formal difference 
between the two aggregation exercises. This difference concerns the status of the Pareto 
condition.  
Pareto: If every individual ranks a at least as highly as b and some individuals rank a higher 
than b, then a is ranked higher than b by the collective. 
This condition is intuitively plausible for preference aggregation, if we think of 
collective preferences as primarily guides to choice and if we in addition take it to be 
important that the collective in its choices endeavors to satisfy individual preferences. If some 
individuals prefer a to b and everyone else is indifferent, then it does seem reasonable for the 
collective to prefer a to b, since it should opt for a in the choice between a and b in order to 
maximize individual preference satisfaction. By opting for a rather than b, it will satisfy the 
preferences of some and frustrate the preferences of no one.
9
  
To be sure, one might question the validity of the Pareto condition for preference 
aggregation. And indeed it has been questioned by Teddy Seidenfeld (in private 
communication). His objection goes like this: If the collective prefers a to b, then it should be 
willing to sacrifice something in order to get a rather than b. But, if only few members of the 
collective prefer a to b, while the overwhelming majority is indifferent, then why should the 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 The general idea that aggregation of rankings can be reduced to aggregation of judgments sets has been used by 
List & Pettit (2004) and by Dietrich & List (2007) in their reduction of Arrow’s theorem to an impossibility 
theorem for judgment aggregation. However, I would argue that this reduction is problematic (unless it is meant 
as a purely formal exercise) if what is being aggregated are not value rankings, but preference rankings, as these 
authors assume. The statement of an individual i’s weak preference for a over b is on their proposal interpreted 
as the claim “from i’s perspective, a is at least as good as b”, while the corresponding statement concerning the 
preference of the collective is interpreted as the claim “from the group’s perspective, a is at least as good as b” 
(cf ibid.). If “from X’s perspective” means “according to X”, then this interpretation ignores the difference 
between preferences and value judgments, i.e., precisely the difference that we here focus on.  
9
 Here, I ignore the well-known objections against the Pareto condition that have to do with (i) the impossibility 
of the Paretian liberal (Sen 1970), and with (ii) spurious unanimity in preferences which is due to differences in 
individual beliefs (see, for example, Mongin 2005). (Note that both these objections apply not just to the Pareto 
condition, but also to its weaker variant: the unanimity condition.) I assume that the cases we consider are not of 
the kind in which objections (i) and (ii) are applicable.  
11 
 
collective be willing to make any sacrifice? Note that it may well be the case that the majority 
of the members would prefer that no sacrifice be made. That is, while they are indifferent 
between a and b, they would prefer b to a-with-sacrifice, however small.
10
  
It is a striking and thought-provoking objection. However, what it shows, I think, is that 
it is conceivable and not inconsistent to prefer one option to another without being willing to 
make any sacrifice to get the former rather than the latter.
11
 This seems to be the predicament 
of the collective if most of its members are indifferent between a and b and only few prefer a 
to b. That preferences do not always come together with willingness to make sacrifices may 
be surprising, but  - on reflection – we should accept this implication. Especially so, when it 
comes to collective preferences, which are a sort of a theoretical artefact. As such, they need 
not have quite the same features as standard individual preferences.
12
 It seems, then, that we 
do have strong reasons to accept the Pareto condition for the preference aggregation scenario. 
When it comes to the aggregation of value rankings, things are different. In this 
aggregation process it is important to require that the collective judgment as far as possible 
approximates the judgments of the individuals. Needless to say, all individual value 
judgments should then be taken into consideration, to equal extent. Individual judgments to 
the effect that the alternatives that are being compared are equally good should thus be given 
the same consideration as the competing value judgments. Therefore, if some individuals 
believe a to be better than b, but the overwhelming majority believes a and b to be equally 
good, then – it would seem – the collective value judgment should follow the majority view: a 
and b should be considered by the collective to be of equal value. Thus, it is to be expected 
                                                 
10
 But couldn’t one argue that there is room for a collective sacrifice in this case, since the collective could use 
for this purpose the resources that would be made available by those of its members who prefer a to b? This 
response, however, would not help in the absence of private resources. Then every sacrifice would have to draw 
on the collective’s common resource.  
11
 In terms of choice guidance, a preference for a over b guides one to choose a rather than b (if confronted with 
these two alternatives), while willingness to sacrifice something to get a rather than b guides one to choose a-
with-sacrifice rather than b (if these are the alternatives available and the sacrifice is small enough). Clearly, if 
one makes the former choice but not the latter, one need not be logically confused. 
12
 The picture changes if we think of preference aggregation in welfarist terms. If the collective’s goal is to 
maximize the welfare of its members and the degree of preference satisfaction is identified with the degree of 
welfare, then, on this interpretation, if some individuals prefer a to b and everyone else is indifferent, the total 
welfare is increased by a move from b to a. On this picture, sacrifices can be justified, even if those who prefer a 
to b are few. Even then the collective still has a reason to sacrifice something in order to get a rather than b, but 
the size of the sacrifice should be correspondingly small, so that it can be outweighed in its welfare effects by the 
gains of the individuals who prefer a to b. 
12 
 
that the Pareto condition will be violated by any reasonable procedure for the aggregation of 
value rankings.
13
 
A worry concerning this view has been raised by Franz Dietrich:
14
 On his suggestion, a 
profile of individual ordinal evaluations might be seen as an incomplete representation of a 
profile of interpersonally comparable cardinal evaluations of the items that are being 
compared. This ordinal representation is incomplete to the extent that it admits of a broad 
range of different cardinal extensions. Now, when it comes to the aggregation of 
interpersonally comparable cardinal evaluations, it is very plausible to use as the aggregation 
rule some form of weighted average, in which the evaluation of each individual is given a 
positive weight. But this means that if some individuals rank a above b, while all the others 
rank these two items equally, then on any cardinal extension of this profile of rankings, the 
weighted-average aggregation rule will deliver a collective evaluation in which a is ranked 
above b. In other words, Pareto will be satisfied on every cardinal extension, which suggests 
that Pareto should be satisfied even when it is not determined which of the cardinal extensions 
is the right one. 
I am inclined to respond to this worry by insisting that what I focus on are cases of 
aggregation in which what is being aggregated are fundamentally ordinal individual 
evaluations, i.e. evaluations that are made merely in terms of “better”, “equally good” and 
“worse”. They shouldn’t be seen as expressions of underlying cardinal comparisons between 
options.
15
 Or, more cautiously, to the extent that cardinal comparisons might be implicit in the 
individual evaluations, we cannot assume that individual cardinal evaluations are fully 
interpersonally comparable. This makes such rules as weighted average inapplicable. 
In his comments to this paper, Franz Dietrich suggests that there might be another way 
to defend the rejection of the Pareto condition for aggregation of value rankings. I quote:  
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 Note, however, that if one changes the nature of the judgment aggregation task, then Pareto-type 
considerations might become applicable. Thus, suppose that the task for the collective is to pick out a best 
alternative (just one of them, if there are several), rather than to deliver a complete value ranking as an output. 
Then, if all the other alternatives are according to everyone inferior to a and b, the collective should, it seems, 
come up with a as its proposal, if some members of the collective consider a to be better than b and all the other 
members (perhaps the overwhelming majority) take a and b to be equally good. The reason is that the collective 
is unanimous about a being one of the best alternatives, but not about b being one of them. I am indebted to 
Gustaf Arrhenius for pressing this point. 
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 In his comments at an LSE workshop on deliberation, in June 2011. 
15
 Franz Dietrich is not impressed with this reply, however. He writes (in his referee comments): “Should the 
rejection of the Pareto principle rely on people’s (current) inability to develop finer (i.e., cardinal rather than 
ordinal) judgments?” Well, I don’t see why not. What we aggregate are people’s current value judgments, after 
all. 
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To me, the best defense of your claim [that the Pareto condition isn’t valid as as general principle for the 
aggregation of value judgements] would be a third route. Suppose value levels are objectively "discrete". 
For instance, the value of something is either "high"/"good" or "low"/"bad", and nothing in between 
makes any sense. Or, exactly seven value levels might [make] sense. In such a case, a compromise 
between two neighbouring value levels is meaningless. If the overwhelming majority of people rank a 
equally valuable as b and the remaining people rank a over b, then (since a cannot be "very very slightly" 
better than b, as there are objective value steps) a should be socially judged equally valuable as b, against 
the Pareto principle. Note that this defense of your claim doesn’t come from the (epistemic) problem that 
people are unable to form nonordinal value judgments, but from the (metaphysical) problem that value is 
discrete rather than continuous. 
This argument is ingenious and plausible, but – obviously – its presupposition that value 
orderings are basically discrete might be questioned. 
Let me assume, anyway, that I am right in my suggestion that the Pareto condition, 
which is valid for preference aggregation, doesn’t hold for the aggregation of value 
rankings.
16
 What lessons can we draw from this? Now, as it turns out, the Pareto condition is 
violated by any method of aggregation that consists in distance minimization. Intuitively 
speaking, if in a large majority of individual inputs a and b are equally ranked, then it is only 
to be expected that these two alternatives will be equally ranked in the outcome that is 
maximally similar to the inputs. 
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 There might be other interesting formal differences between aggregation of judgments and aggregation of 
preferences. One difference was mentioned above: For judgment aggregation it might seem reasonable or 
perhaps even mandatory to suspend a collective judgment in case of a tie between optimal outcomes of the 
aggregation procedure. It might not be permissible for the collective to opt for one particular judgmental 
outcome, if there are other outcomes that are equally satisfactory. The solution is to accept only what’s common 
to all such outcomes. This restriction doesn’t seem to apply or at least is not equally compelling in the case of 
preference aggregation, so far as I can see. Another, related difference concerns the issue of individual 
suspension of judgment. An individual might well suspend judgment, if the evidence isn’t conclusive. It is less 
clear whether suspending preference is equally natural. Maybe it is possible to lack a preferential attitude with 
respect to two alternatives, where this absence of preference is something else than indifference (cf. Rabinowicz 
2008). But abstaining from preference is in any case more problematic than abstaining from judgment. (Note, 
though, that it is perfectly unproblematic to abstain from declaring a preference. But that’s something else, of 
course.) 
A further difference that sometimes is mentioned in this context is that judgments are logically 
interrelated in various ways. I think, however, that the same goes for preferences. If, as I would argue, 
preference is not so much a dyadic comparative attitude, but rather a relation between the degrees of monadic 
attitudes of favouring or disfavoring, i.e., if preferring one item to another consists in favouring it to a higher 
degree or disfavouring it to a lesser degree, then preferences are logically related as well. Transitivity, for 
example, is on this picture a logical relation: preferring a to b and b to c logically implies preferring a to c. (Cf. 
Rabinowicz 2012.)  
Yet another difference has to do with anonymity. While this condition is nearly always assumed for 
preference aggregation, it appears less obvious as far as judgment aggregation is concerned: After all, some of 
the individuals might have more expertise than others, in which case it might seem justified to give more weight 
to their judgments. (I am indebted to Franz Dietrich for pressing this point.) Still, I think that in many contexts 
such differences in expertise are deliberately bracketed in the aggregation procedure: Insisting on some 
memebers of the collective being more competent than others is considered to be inappropriate. Instead, the 
differences in expertise often play an important role in determining who the relevant members are going to be: 
When committees are formed, their members are chosen on the basis of competence.  
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That minimization of average distance violates the Pareto condition is something that 
can be shown quite generally, for all possible distance measures. More precisely, we can 
prove the following: 
Observation 1: Suppose the set A of alternatives consists of just a and b. Consider any 
distance measure on the rankings of A. If a minority of individuals ranks a higher than b, 
while everyone else (i.e. a majority) ranks a and b equally, then the latter ranking has a 
shorter average distance to the individual rankings than the former. 
Proof: If d is a distance measure, then, for all x and y,  
(i) d(x, y) is a non-negative real number that equals 0 iff x = y.  
Also, symmetry holds:  
(ii) d(x, y) = d(y, x).  
Consequently, if the number of individuals who rank a above b is m, while the remaining n - 
m individuals rank a and b equally, (i) implies that the average distance from the unequal 
ranking (a over b) to the individual rankings is (m0 + (n - m)k)/n, i.e., (n - m)k/n, where k > 0 
is the distance from the unequal ranking to the equal one. By (ii), the average distance from 
the equal ranking to the individual rankings is (mk + (n - m)0)/n, i.e., mk/n. Now, since k > 0, 
mk/n < (n - m)k/n if and only if m < n - m,  
i.e., the average distance to the individual rankings is shorter from the equal ranking than 
from the ranking that places a above b if and only if the individuals who rank a and b equally 
are in majority.
17
 
It should be mentioned, though, that if the number of alternatives is increased, it will no 
longer always be the case that the equal ranking of a and b is going to be favoured by the 
average distance minimization in a Pareto-type case. Even if only a minority ranks a over b, 
while everyone else ranks a and b equally, other alternatives might come in between a and b 
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 Note that this result does not presuppose triangle inequality. This means that it holds not only for all distance 
measures but in fact for the larger class of all cardinal dissimilarity measures. (Cardinality must be assumed if 
minimization of the average dissimilarity is to make sense). 
Note also that this Observation 1 will still hold if we apply a ‘prioritarian’ rule of distance minimization, 
i.e. replace distance with its convex transform in the minimization of the average. Such a change would only 
mean that we replace 0 and k with their convex transforms. Since k > 0, the same applies to the convex 
transforms of k and 0, which is sufficient for the conclusion we have been after. The result we have proved will 
also hold for the ‘leximin’ approach, since the number n-m of individual rankings to which the unequal ranking 
has the maximal distance, k, is larger than the corresponding number (m) for the equal ranking. This result will 
not hold, however, if we use the simple maximin, because the maximal distance to individual rankings is the 
same for both the equal and the unequal rankings. But even maximin will violate Pareto, since it will pick out 
equal ranking as one of the optimal solutions in this case. 
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in the minority rankings, which complicates the picture. Thus, consider the following case 
with three alternatives, a, b, and c, and three individual rankings, x, y and z: 
x  y  z 
 a  c a b 
 c a b  c 
 b   
In this example one voter a placed above b, while the remaining two voters rank a and b 
equally. If we use the KS-measure of distance, it is easy to see that the average KS-distance 
from x to {x, y, z} is 2, which is shorter than the corresponding distance to {x, y, z} from any 
other ranking, and in particular from any ranking in which a and b are placed at the same 
level. Their average KS-distance to {x, y, z} is 7/3 in each case. Thus, in this particular case, 
the Pareto condition is satisfied if one follows the Kemeny rule. 
Still, this is just a marginal point. The main lesson is the following: The Pareto 
condition marks an important dividing line between aggregation of preferences and 
aggregation of value rankings. As a result, distance minimization, which violates Pareto, 
seems fine as an aggregation method for judgments, but not for preferences. 
It might be mentioned that there is another condition, closely related to Pareto, with 
respect to which aggregation of preferences differs from aggregation of value rankings. The 
intuition behind the Pareto condition for preference aggregation is that the voters who are 
indifferent may be safely ignored, since their preferences won’t be frustrated anyway, 
whatever ranking the collective decides upon. In case of Pareto, this applies to voters who are 
locally indifferent, i.e. whose indifference concerns a given pair of alternatives. But 
“irrelevance of indifferent voters” can be extended to global indifference as well. The 
principle that expresses the latter intuition can be formulated as follows: 
Indifference: The collective ranking of the alternatives doesn’t change if voters who rank all 
the alternatives equally are removed from consideration (as long as some voters still remain to 
be considered). 
As is easy to see, the Pareto condition can be derived from Indifference conjoined with 
Unanimity, if Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is assumed. Here is the proof: Suppose 
that everyone ranks a at least as highly as b and some individuals rank a higher than b. By 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, in order to determine the mutual standing of a and b, 
we can exclude from consideration all the other alternatives, i.e. we can reduce the set of 
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alternatives to {a, b}, while keeping the individuals’ rankings of a and b unchanged. By 
Indifference, we can then also exclude from consideration all the voters who rank a and b 
equally. Since all the remaining voters by hypothesis rank a higher than b, Unanimity entails 
that the collective ranks a higher than b.  
Admittedly, this proof isn’t worth very much, since Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives is a highly questionable principle. But the proof at least shows that Pareto is 
related to Indifference, in terms of the underlying intuitions.  
Now, while Indifference, as we have seen, is a reasonable principle for preference 
aggregation, it is intuitively implausible for the aggregation of value rankings. Judgments of 
voters who rank the alternatives equally should surely be given just as much consideration as 
judgments of the other voters. And, using the same case as the one that we have made use of 
in Observation 1, it is easy to show that Indifference, just as Pareto, is violated by 
minimization of average distance, for all possible distance measures. 
Observation 2: Suppose the set A of alternatives consists of just a and b. Consider any 
distance measure on the rankings of A. If a minority of individuals ranks a higher than b, 
while everyone else (a majority) ranks a and b equally, then (i) the unequal ranking doesn’t 
have the minimal average distance to the individual rankings. But (ii) if the individuals who 
rank a and b equally are excluded from consideration, then the ranking in which a comes 
above b does have the minimal average distance to the remaining individual rankings.
18
 
This means then that removing indifferent voters from consideration does change the outcome 
of the distance minimization procedure, in violation of Indifference. 
Proof of Observation 2: (i) follows from Observation 1. As for (ii), if the individuals who rank 
a and b equally are excluded from consideration, then all the remaining individuals rank a 
higher than b. But then, by the definition of a distance measure, the ranking in which a comes 
above b has a shorter average distance to these remaining individual rankings (namely, 
distance zero) than any other ranking. 
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 Just as it was the case with Observation 1, this result will still hold if we replace distance with a dissimilarity 
measure that does not obey triangle inequality. And it will hold if we minimize the average convex transform of 
distance or if we apply ‘leximin’. 
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Aggregation of value rankings from the epistemic perspective 
This section is just a rough sketch. It poses questions, but leaves them unanswered.
19
 
As is well-known, judgment aggregation can be seen as an epistemic device: as a way of 
arriving to an opinion that has good chances of being correct. The classical result in this area 
is Condorcet’s jury theorem for majority voting: If (i) the voters are relatively competent with 
respect to a proposition A, i.e., if they are at least better than purely random devices as far as 
the probability of correctly judging the truth of A is concerned, if (ii) their competence is the 
same, and if (iii) their judgments concerning A are independent of each other, then the 
majority’s assessment of A is more reliable than a single voter’s (i.e., the probability of the 
majority’s judgment being true exceeds the corresponding probability for a judgment of a 
single voter) and the reliability of the majority judgment converges to 1 as the number of 
voters goes up to infinity. The underlying intuition behind the jury theorem is very simple: If 
the voters can be seen as relatively reliable independent sources of information concerning the 
question at hand, then – clearly - the more such sources we consult, the better.  
What one wonders is whether this epistemic approach could be used for the aggregation 
of value judgments. The affirmative answer presupposes (i) that value judgments can be 
independently true or false (or, more cautiously, correct or incorrect), and (ii) that epistemic 
competence with respect to such judgments is possible. In fact, Condorcet himself thought 
that both these conditions could well be satisfied and he formulated his jury theorem precisely 
for the aggregation of value rankings:
20
 He proved it as a part of his argument in favor of 
using the pairwise majority rule as the aggregation method for value rankings. His idea was 
that each voter could be seen as a relatively competent judge with respect to each pair of 
alternatives. The question he then posed was: What ranking would most probably correspond 
to the true value ranking, given the rankings of the voters?  
The assumptions he made were the following: 
- Only linear rankings are allowed as individual inputs. 
- Each voter has the same competence as any other voter. 
- Each voter has the same competence with respect to each pair of alternatives.  
- The probability of a voter’s judgment being correct is probabilistically independent of the 
correctness of other voters’ judgments. 
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 Some preliminary answers have been reached in a joint work with Stephan Hartmann. 
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 Cf. Condorcet (1785). The presentation that follows is based on Young (1988). 
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Under these conditions, he argued, the judgments of the majority would be the ones one 
should follow, for each pair of alternatives: The pairwise majority ranking has the highest 
probability of being correct, apart from the cases in which the majority method leads to cycles 
(i.e., cases in which we encounter Condorcet’s voting paradox). The cycling cases had to be 
treated in a more complicated way. (Condorcet’s particular proposal how to do it wasn’t 
satisfactory, however. Young (1988) suggested a needed improvement.)  
Condorcet’s assumption that individual inputs are linear orderings, i.e., do not contain 
any ties, is restrictive and should be rejected. Also, it might be of interest to look at individual 
value rankings holistically, rather than piecemeal, i.e. pair by pair, as Condorcet has done. 
Instead of ascribing to individuals epistemic competence with respect to each pair of 
alternatives, separately, we might want to ascribe to them competence with respect to the 
ranking as a whole. From this holistic perspective, it would be interesting to pose questions 
about the epistemic value of distance minimization as an aggregation procedure: How does 
such a procedure fare from the epistemic standpoint? How good is it as a truth-tracker? Are 
some distance measures preferable from this epistemic viewpoint to other distance measures? 
Note that, for distance-based aggregation procedures, we can try to compute not only 
the probability of truth for an outcome, i.e. the probability of an aggregation outcome being 
the true ranking, but also the expected verisimilitude of that outcome, or, equivalently, its 
expected distance from truth. By this I mean the sum of the outcome’s distances to different 
possible rankings, with the distances in question being weighted with the probabilities for 
each of those rankings of being the true ranking of the alternatives. A reasonable question 
about a procedure that minimizes average distance to individual inputs is how good it is, as 
compared with a single voter, not only in increasing the probability of truth, but also in 
decreasing the expected distance to truth. 
It is not quite clear, though, how to deal with the epistemic issues in the case under 
consideration. In the standard Condorcetian set-up, the voters face a binary choice: to vote for 
or against a given proposition. But in the case we are interested in, each voter instead chooses 
a ranking out of the set of all possible rankings of the available alternatives. So the choice is 
not binary. 
List and Goodin (2001) extended Condorcet’s theorem to the case of choice among 
several options. A rule they proved to have Condorcetian features was plurality voting: the 
option that gets the largest amount of votes wins. That option is more likely to be correct than 
any other option on the table. (Which doesn’t mean, of course, that it is more likely than not 
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that this option is correct.) But List and Goodin did not consider potential similarities and 
dissimilarities between the options. Such similarity relations play an important role when 
options are structured objects, such as rankings. For this reason, minimization of the average 
distance might well yield as an outcome a ranking that no voter has proposed. For example, if 
half of the voters rank four alternatives, a, b, c, and d, in this descending order, while the 
other half rank them in the opposite order, the equal ranking of the four alternatives will be 
the unique optimal choice according to the Kemeny rule. 
For the Condorcetian approach in which we view the problem as the case of choice 
between rankings and the purpose is to increase the probability of truth, a reasonable idea 
would be to ascribe to each voter epistemic competence understood along the following lines: 
The probability of the voter picking the true ranking should be higher than some threshold. A 
plausible probability threshold appears to be 1/the number of all possible rankings of the 
available alternatives. This value is the probability that a ranking picked at random will be the 
correct one. 
What should the analogue of Condorcet’s theorem establish for the case of an 
aggregation procedure that need not deliver a unique result? Remember that there might be 
several rankings that are optimal in the sense that each minimizes the average distance to the 
input rankings. What should we expect from a good truth-tracking procedure in such a case? 
Possibly, at least the following: The probability of each of the optimal rankings being correct 
should be higher than the corresponding probability for any non-optimal ranking. Also, the 
probability of one of the optimal rankings being correct should converge to 1 when the 
number of (relatively competent and independent) voters goes to infinity. 
If the epistemic objective for an aggregation procedure is minimization of the expected 
truth-distance (maximization of expected verisimilitude) rather than maximization of the 
probability of truth, then a voter’s competence should instead be specified as the expected 
truth-distance of her ranking. What is a reasonable competence threshold in this case is 
unclear. But perhaps something like this could fit the bill: The expected truth-distance of the 
voter’s ranking should be higher than the expected truth-distance that the equal ranking would 
have under the uniform probability distribution among rankings. It can be shown that, under 
such probability distribution, the equal ranking minimizes the expected truth-distance, as 
measured by KS (cf. Rabinowicz 2011b), and it is a fair conjecture that a similar result can be 
established for other plausible distance measures. In this sense, then, a voter is more reliable 
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that an ignorant person who chooses an option that minimizes expected truth-distance under 
the state of total ignorance.
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When is the aggregation procedure satisfactory from the perspective of the 
minimization of expected truth-distance? I suppose that at least the following must be 
required: The expected truth-distance of each optimal ranking (i.e. optimal according to a 
given procedure) should be shorter than the corresponding distance of the non-optimal 
rankings. Also, the average expected truth-distance of the optimal rankings should converge 
to 0 when the number of voters goes to infinity. 
That distance-based methods of aggregating value rankings are satisfactory in terms of 
increasing the probability of truth and decreasing the expected distance from truth are as yet 
just unproven conjectures. I hope they can be tested in future work. 
 
Summing up 
The focus of this paper was on the contrast between aggregation of preferences and 
aggregation of judgments, with a particular attention to value judgments that have the form of 
rankings. Distance-based aggregation methods, which presuppose that aggregation is treated 
as an optimization task, seem to provide an attractive way of finessing the standard 
impossibility theorems. Such methods can differ from each other depending on the distance 
measure they assume, but also depending on the particular use to which they put the measure 
in question (minimization of the average distance, of the average squared distance, leximin, 
etc). However, as has been argued here, the distance-based methods appear to be appropriate 
for judgment aggregation but not for the aggregation of preferences. The reason is that they 
violate the Pareto condition and the condition of Indifference, which represent a watershed 
between preference aggregation and the seemingly analogous task of aggregating value 
rankings.  
As methods of judgment aggregation, the distance-based approaches invite an 
evaluation from the epistemic perspective. How good are they in increasing the probability of 
truth and in increasing the expected verisimilitude? Some tentative thoughts on how to go 
about these epistemic issues were presented above. 
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 Another way of interpreting a voter’s competence regarding expected verisimilitude would be to assume that, 
for any ranking x, the probability that the voter chooses that ranking decreases with the increase of the distance 
between x and the true ranking.
 
Should this decrease in probability be proportional to the increases in distance? I 
am not sure. 
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Appendix: Measuring distance between rankings 
Let A be the set of alternatives and let d(x, y) stand for the distance between rankings x and y 
of the alternatives in A. Kemeny and Snell (1962) have shown that the KS-metric, which 
takes this distance to be the number of ordered pairs of alternatives in A with respect to which 
x and y disagree with other, is the only measure of distance between rankings that satisfies 
their set of axioms. One of these axioms is the axiom of betweenness: 
Betweenness: If a ranking y lies between rankings x and z, then  
d(x, y) + d(y, z) = d(x, z). 
Intuitively, being between x and z can be understood as being located on the straight line 
connecting x with z (or on one of such straight lines, if the relevant geometry allows for 
several straight lines existing between two points in a given space). On this picture, it is 
obvious that Betweenness must hold.
22
  
Kemeny and Snell’s uniqueness result for the KS- measure is based, however, on their 
particular definition of betweenness, which might well be questioned:  
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 The standard triangle inequality axiom for distance states that d(x, y) + d(y, z)  d(x, z), for all x, y, and z. 
Betweenness adds that this inequality becomes an equality when y is located between x and z. 
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y lies between x and z iff x, y and z are distinct rankings such that (i) y contains 
every ordered pair that belongs to both x and z, and (ii) every ordered pair in y 
belongs to x or z (or to both). 
Apart from the betweenness axiom, the other axioms imposed by Kemeny and Snell 
seem rather innocuous. They stipulate that d satisfies the standard conditions on a distance 
measure: d(x, y) is a non-negative real value; each x has distance 0 only to itself; the distance 
between x and y is the same as that between y and x (symmetry); the sum of the distances 
between x and y and between y and z is a least as large as the distance between x and z 
(triangle inequality). In addition, Kemeny and Snell assume that the distance measure is not 
sensitive to the identity of the alternatives that are being ranked: 
Neutrality: d is invariant under all permutations of the alternatives.  
They also impose two additional axioms: 
Reduction: If x and y agree in their top (bottom) alternatives, then d(x, y) is the 
same as the distance between these rankings after all the top (bottom) alternatives 
have been removed.
23
 
Minimum: The minimal positive distance is 1. 
 
Is the KS-metric a satisfactory measure of distance between rankings? It is not that easy 
to tell. One worry is that this measure seems to be insufficiently favourable to compromises. 
Condorcet’s voting paradox may be used to illustrate this point. Thus, suppose that the 
individual inputs are the following three rankings, x, y and z, of three alternatives, a, b and c: 
   x y z 
  a b c 
  b c a 
  c a b 
An attempt to arrive to the collective ranking using the simple majority rule ends up 
with a cycle in this case: a is ranked above b, which is ranked above c, which is ranked above 
a. Intuitively, the natural compromise would be instead to opt for the equal ranking  
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 In fact, this axiom is redundant. As has recently been shown by Can and Storcken (2013), Reduction follows 
from the other axioms. 
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    a, b, c  
as the collective outcome. 
But it is easy to calculate that the average KS-distance from the equal ranking to the 
rankings in the set {x, y, z} is larger than the average distance from each of the rankings in 
this set to the set as a whole. While the former is 3, the latter equals 8/3.
24
 Thus, the 
compromise solution – the equal ranking – is rejected by the Kemeny rule. In fact, this rule 
yields as the output the original set of inputs: {x, y, z}. Each input ranking minimizes the 
average KS-distance to the Condorcetian set of input rankings.
25
 
The compromise equal-ranking solution is rejected, because, by the KS-definition of 
betweenness, the equal ranking is not located between any two rankings in the set {x, y, z}. 
Thus, consider, for example, x and y. In both of them b is ranked above c, but in the equal 
ranking these two alternatives are tied. Thus, clause (ii) of the KS-definition of betweenness is 
not satisfied by the equal ranking: the ordered pair (c, b) belongs to that ranking but it does 
not belong to either x or y. This location of the equal ranking explains why the distance from x 
to y is shorter than the sum of the distances from x to the equal ranking and from the equal 
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 The KS-distance of the equal ranking to each ranking in {x, y, z} is 3. On the other hand, each ranking that 
belongs to this set has the KS-distance 4 to each of the other two rankings in the set, which means that its 
average KS-distance to {x, y, z} is (0 + 4 +4)/3 = 8/3. 
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 If one thinks that the right approach for the collective is to suspend judgment among optimal options, and 
interprets suspending judgment as accepting only what’s common to all the optimal options, i.e., only their 
intersection (see fn. 4 above), then in the Condorcet paradox the collective output would be the empty set of 
ordered pairs. In other cases, the intersection of the options chosen by the Kemeny rule might not be empty but 
still need not be a complete ranking. A natural question to ask is what would be the status of such a partial 
ranking from the point of view of distance-minimization? Would it still minimize the average distance to the 
individual inputs? To answer this question we would first need to generalize KS-distance to partial rankings: For 
any two such rankings, the KS-distance between them can still, I suppose, be understood as the number of 
ordered pairs with respect to which the two rankings differ. Note that, on this definition, the KS-distance from 
the empty set to each individual input ranking in Condorcet’s paradox is 3, just as the KS-distance from the 
equal ranking, which means that the empty set of pairs does not minimize the average KS-distance. In other 
words, by suspending judgment, we suffer a loss in terms of distance minimization. The intersection of the 
optimal options need not itself be optimal. (For a generalization of distance to partial rankings, see Cook, Cress, 
and Seiford 1986.) 
On the other hand, if suspending judgment with respect to the class of optimal options is interpreted as 
moving to an indeterminate state in which the collective undecided between options in this class (cf. fn. 4 
above), then – in order to answer the question whether this class solution itself is optimal in terms of distance 
minimization – we need to determine the distances from such a class to different individual inputs. But this 
means that we need to determine how to measure the distance between a class of rankings and a single ranking. 
The natural answer seems to be that the choice here depends on the rule we are using: If it is the Kemeny rule, 
i.e. the rule of minimization of the average distance to individual inputs, then we should interpret the distance 
between a class of rankings C and a single ranking x in the corresponding way – as the average distance from the 
elements of C to x. (Analogously if we use the maximin rule, then we should interpret the distance between C 
and x correspondingly, as the maximal distance from the elements of C to x. And so on.) Given this 
interpretation, it is easy to see that if several rankings are optimal, then the class of these rankings will also be 
optimal. The reason is that if several rankings have the same (minimal) average distance to individual inputs, 
then this will also be the average distance from the class of these rankings to individual inputs. 
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ranking to y. The corresponding result holds for the distances form x to z and from y to z. 
Which explains why the equal ranking doesn’t come out well on the KS-measure. 
Thus, if we want to have a measure that favours compromises, we might be well-
advised to redefine the notion of betweenness. This, in essence, is what was done by Cook & 
Seiford (1978).
26
 They defined their measure as follows: We start with assigning numbers, 
call them the CS-numbers, to the alternatives in a ranking, starting with 1 for the top 
alternative, 2 for the next-best alternative, etc. In case of a tie, we assign the average number 
to the tied alternatives. Thus, to take an example, if there is one alternatives at the top and two 
alternatives are tied just below, each of the latter gets the average of 2 and 3, i.e. 2,5.
27
 To 
avail ourselves of some formalism, let a
x
 be the CS-number of alternative a in ranking x. The 
CS-distance between rankings is the sum of the absolute differences between the CS-numbers 
of the alternatives in the rankings in question: 
  d(x, y) = aAa
x
 - a
y 
The equal ranking (a, b, c) does minimize the average CS-distance to the rankings in 
Condorcet’s paradox: In particular, the average CS-distance to {x, y, z} from each ranking in 
that set is 8/3, while the average CS-distance of the equal ranking to {x, y, z} is 2. 
Cook and Seiford (1978) prove that their measure is the only one that satisfies the set of 
axioms that are very similar to the KS-axioms, but with the betweenness relation interpreted 
in a new way. On their definition of betweenness,  
y lies between x and z iff x, y and z are distinct rankings such that, for every 
alternative a in A, its CS-number in y is between its CS-numbers in x and z. I.e., 
a
x
  ay  az or ax  ay  az.  
                                                 
26
 Another alternative would be to keep the KS-measure but replace the Kemeny rule (= minimization of the 
average distance) with some rule that puts a premium on solutions that do not lie too far away from any of the 
inputs. This would favour compromise solutions. For example, we could opt for minimization of the average 
convex transform of distance or for a leximin-type approach (see above). As a matter of fact, Cook and Seiford 
in another paper suggested using minimization of the average of squared distances as a method of reaching the 
consensus ranking. Cf. Cook & Seiford (1982). 
27
 This kind of numbering was suggested by Kendall (1962). Note that one might just as well reverse the 
ordering and start from the bottom instead of the top. In addition, one might start with 0 instead of 1. If one then 
assigns higher numbers as one moves upwards in the ranking, then this version of the CS-numbering is a variant 
of the well-known Borda count, with ties taken into consideration: Each alternative below a gives a one point; 
each alternative tied with a gives a half a point; and the sum of the points received by a is its Borda number in a 
given ranking. 
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Obviously, a disadvantage of this definition from the intuitive point of view is that it might be 
accused of begging the issue: It is very closely tied to Cook and Seiford’s own method of 
calculating distance. 
Still, on this definition of betweenness, in contrast to the KS-definition, the equal 
ranking of a, b and c does lie between any two input rankings in Condorcet’s paradox. Thus, 
to illustrate, consider rankings x and y in that example: 
  x y 
  a b 
  b c 
  c a 
In the equal ranking, each alternative gets 2 as its CS-number (i.e., (1+2+3)/3), while the CS-
numbers for the alternatives in x and y are, respectively, 1 and 3 for a, 2 and 1 for b, and 3 and 
2 for c. Thus, for each alternative, its CS-number in the equal ranking is between its CS-
numbers in x and y.  
This explains why the equal ranking, which doesn’t minimize the average KS-distance 
to the rankings in Condorcet’s paradox, does minimize the average CS-distance to these 
rankings.  
Needless to say, there have been other attempts to replace the KS-metric with 
competing measures of distance between rankings. One such proposal is due to Duddy and 
Piggins (2012). Essentially, their idea is to look at the distance between two rankings as the 
smallest number of steps needed to transform one ranking into the other. ‘Steps’ are defined 
as follows: You need just one step to move from one ranking x to another ranking y iff you 
can reach one from the other just by raising or lowering the position of a single alternative a 
with respect to some set X of alternatives that are equal-ranked in x and making no other 
changes in the relative positions of the alternatives. This is possible only in two cases: (i) if a 
is equal-ranked in x with the alternatives in X or (ii) if a in x is immediately above or below X. 
If (i) holds, then you can raise a to a position immediately above X or lower it to a position 
immediately below X. If (ii) holds, then you can move a to X’s level. Thus, to give an 
example, there is just one step between these two rankings: 
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   x    y 
   a 
  b c a b c 
Thus, on their approach, the distance between these rankings equals 1, while on both the 
KS- and the CS-approach, this distance is longer (equals 2). Duddy and Piggins (2012) 
characterize the difference between the Kemeny metric and their own metric as follows: 
“Under the Kemeny metric, [in each step] we can raise or lower the position of one alternative 
relative to just one other alternative. Under our metric, at each step we can raise or lower the 
position of one alternative relative to multiple other alternatives, provided those other 
alternatives are together in a single equivalence class [i.e., provided they are tied].” 
KS, CS and DP all order distances between rankings in different ways. Thus, on the CS-
approach, the distance between x and the equal ranking y in the example that we have just 
given is the same as that from y to any linear ranking of a, b and c, while on the DP-approach 
the latter distance is longer: it requires two steps. If one now compares KS with DP and CS, 
then it is easy to see that on both the DP- and the CS-approach the distance between x and the 
linear ranking of a, b, and c, in this order, is the same as the distance between x and y, while 
on the KS-approach the latter distance is longer than the former.  
It might be noted that, just like the CS-approach, the DP-approach favours 
compromises: It picks out the equal ranking as the outcome in the Condorcet paradox.
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 Might there be some other distance measures that are worth considering? An interesting but still undeveloped 
suggestion has been made by Gustaf Arrhenius (in private communication) in connection with KS: The KS-
measure only considers the ordered pairs with respect to which two rankings differ. But why not also look at the 
triples, quadruples, etc? (A triple (a, b, c) can be said to belong to a ranking x iff x ranks a at least as highly as b 
and ranks b at least as highly as c. Similarly for quadruples, etc.) If x and y differ from each other with respect to 
the same number of pairs as x and z, but as x and z differ with respect to more triples, for example, then one 
might think that the distance between x and y should be shorter than the one between x and z. Examples of this 
kind have been independently constructed by Erik Carlson and Arrhenius. Here is one such case: 
x y z  u 
a b b b 
b c d a  
c d a d 
d a c c 
Rankings x and y differ from each other with respect to six pairs and so do rankings x and z. But x and y differ 
with respect to fewer triples, since they have the triple (b, c, d) in common. 
However, it is unclear how such an alternative measure, which not only considers pairs, should look like. 
In particular, how does it deal with trade-offs? For example: How should one weigh a disagreement in a triple as 
compared with a disagreement in a pair? To illustrate, in the example above x and y differ with respect to two 
more pairs than x and u (six pairs versus four). But x and u differ with respect to two more triples: (b, c, d) and 
(b, d, c). Is the distance between x and u shorter or longer than the distance between x and y? 
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